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A unique feature of the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is that it enables
the researcher to determine a priori which households would like to hold more
debt than lenders will allow [e.g., Jappelli (1990)]. Based on these data, 30
percent of households under age 35 in 1983 faced binding borrowing constraints.
To evaluate the effect of borrowing constraints, this study first estimates a
bivariate probit model of who is not credit constrained and would like to hold
positive debt. Controlling for selection effects, a debt demand function is then
estimated using only unconstrained households that hold positive debt.
Results indicate that households with strong intrinsic preferences for holding
debt are more likely to be credit constrained, while lenders vary borrOWing
constraints across borrowers on the basis of observable characteristics that
proxy credit risk, consistent with "screening" models of credit rationing. As
might be expected, unconstrained and constrained families exhibit significantly
different behavior (at least with respect to their demand for debt). Moreover,
of the constrained households in the sample, roughly half would hold
substantially more debt if borrowing constraints were relaxed, ceteris paribus.
These results prOVide one explanation for why empirical studies of household
consumption and consumer spending frequently find evidence that is not consistent
with a strict interpretation of the Life Cycle and Permanent Income Hypotheses.I. Introduction
The seminal study of Hall (1978) has spawned an empirical literature on
testing the implications of the Life-Cycle and Permanent Income Hypotheses
(henceforth, the LCH). A major motivation for much of the literature in this
area is that a failure of the LCH to hold in its strongest form would imply that
current income, in addition to anticipated or permanent income, could affect real
consumption expenditures, thereby opening a potential channel for macro-
stabilization policy. In addition, a failure of the LCH would also imply a
possible role for current income in determining purchases of housing and other
important consumer durables. 1
Of the empirical studies in this area, one tradition has been to test
whether the time series properties of nondurable consumption expenditures are
consistent with the implications of the LCH [e.g., Campbell and Mankiw (1987),
Flavin (1981), Hall (1978), and Wilcox (1989)]. However, time series studies
that reject the LCH typically cannot identify why the LCH does not hold in their
analysis, although speculation has focused on borrowing constraints.2•3 Other
studies have used cross-section or panel data to test whether the pattern of
nondurable expenditures differs between families that do not face binding
borrOWing constraints versus families for whom borrowing constraints may be
binding [e.g., Hall and Mishkin (1982), Hayashi (1985), and Zeldes (1989)]. A
lIn contrast, most empirical studies of housing demand assume that current income
has no role once permanent income is included in the model.
2Explanations for the existence of borrowing constraints generally fall into one
of two groups. The first, typified by Williamson (1986), suggests that debt
constraints arise because of agency costs of default which lenders face but
borrowers generally excape. The other strand of literature, including Jaffee and
Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) among others, emphasizes the role
of asymmetric infomration, adverse selection, and moral hazard.
3As is well known, the LeH may not hold because of borrowing constraints,
transactions costs in the asset or credit markets, or myopic behavior.2
problem with these studies. however, is that the data sets used do not directly
identify which households face binding borrowing constraints. Instead,
researchers typically assume that households with high wealth-to-income ratios
or families with high savings rates are not credit constrained which raises the
possibility of coding errors when splitting out the "unconstrained" households
in the sample [see Jappelli (1990) for a discussion of this point].
In contrast to the studies above, a recently available data set does
identify which households would like to hold more debt than lenders will allow
at existing loan rates. Using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),
Jappelli (1990) investigated the characteristics of families that reported being
denied credit or were dissuaded from applying for credit over the period
1980-1983. An important finding by Jappelli (1990) is that roughly 20 percent
of households in the 1983 SCF perceived themselves as having been constrained by
lenders. The extent to which the behavior of these families was affected by
borrowing constraints, however, has not yet been evaluated.
Although the 1983 SCF does not include sufficient data to construct
estimates of consumption expenditures,· it can be used to assess the degree to
which the total level of debt held by constrained households is depressed by
binding borrowing constraints. 4 To evaluate such effects, as in Jappelli (1990)
we define a household from the 1983 SCF as being credit constrained if a lender
had turned down or not fully granted a household's loan request (and the
household did not successfully reapply at an alternate lender). or if the
household had not applied for credit because it thought that it would be turned
down. For both types of "constrained" families, it is plausible that the level
'We focus on the total level of debt held by households under the assumption that
different forms of debt are close substitutes.3
of debt held by the household is less than or equal to the amount that would be
held if horrowing constraints were relaxed, ceteris paribus, bringing into
question the strong perfect capital markets assumption of the LCH.
Before elaborating on our empirical method note that, consistent with
screening models of credit rationing [e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, part IV, (1981)],
we assume that lenders stratify loan applicants into different groups based on
perceived differences in default risk using observable, albeit imperfect,
indicators of creditworthiness (such as credit history). In the absence of
government intervention and prohibitive information costs, such models would
imply that lenders vary loan rates across borrowers belonging to different risk
categories [see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), for example). However, fair lending
laws and the threat of legal suits create strong incentives for lenders to reduce
the degree to which they vary loan rates across borrowers (at least for consumer
loans).5 In addition, the small size of most household loans (relative to
business loans) and the fixed costs of evaluating loan applicant creditworthiness
further discourage lenders from varying interest rates (and other terms of the
loan contract) across borrowers.
Under these conditions, we assume that competitive lenders offer relatively
similar loan rates to all borrowers but vary debt ceilings across households
using various "rules of thumb" based on readily observable indicators of credit
risk.6 The use of debt ceilings to control for credit risk is consistent with
5Fair Lending laws also require that l~nders to treat similar households in an
equal fashion, which precludes one form of credit rationing discussed by Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), in which some observationally equivalent borrowers are issued
credit while others are not.
6We should emphasize that our empirical model does allow for the possibility that
loan rates may vary somewhat across borrowers (in a manner which will be
clarified later in the paper), though our analysis focuses primarily on the
degree to which debt ceilings are sensitive to household characteristics.4
the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981, Part IV) screening model if one assumes that default
risk increases with loan size and lenders have limited ability to vary interest
rates across loan applicants.7 Moreover, such a model is consistent with
established practices of lenders who regularly use downpayment and payment-to-
income ratios to set debt ceilings when evaluating household loan applications
(particularly for mortgages and auto loans).
Having determined who 1s credit constrained in our sample, the principal
strategy is to first estimate a problt model of who is not credit constrained for
families under age 35.8 A reduced form debt demand function is then estimated
using only unconstrained households, controlling for selection effects, and
results are compared to a model that ignores credit effects. 9 Given the
estimated parameters from the selectivity-adjusted debt function, in principle
it is also possible to predict the level of debt that a constrained family would
7Although Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume a constant loan size across loan
applicants, it can be readily shown that if default risk increases with loan size
and lenders are unable to vary interest rates across households, the Stiglitz-
Weiss screening model implies that lenders will vary debt ceilings across
borrowers in the manner described above.
eWe focus on families under age 35 for two reasons. First, life cycle models
suggest that the debt demand function -- and by extension, the probit model of
who is not credit constrained -- should be stratified by age group (young, middle
age, and older). However, at least for our sample, only for younger households
was there a relatively large concentration of credit constrained families (376).
In addition, much of the academic and policy debate about access to credit has
centered on younger families. .
9A reduced form debt function is estimated because closed-form solutions for
consumption and saving (and by implication for household debt) are impossible to
obtain without strong restrictions on the underlying utility function [e.g., the
CARA utility function in Caballero (1987)]. In addition, testing for Euler
equation violations to evaluate the potential effect of borrowing constraints [as
in Zeldes (1989) J was not feasible because the 1983 SCF lacked the necessary time
series data.5
hold if it had not otherwise been constrained, ceteris paribus.10 Comparing the
actual to the predicted preferred debt holdings of constrained households
provides a eonsistent estimate of the distribution of impacts of borrowing
constraints on household debt (in a partial equilibrium setting). Our results
indicate that 30 percent of young households in 1983 wanted to hold more debt
than lenders would allow, and that roughly half of these families would have held
substantially more debt had borrowing constraints not been binding, ceteris
paribus.
To establish these and other results, this study is organized as follows.
Section II presents our empirical methodology. Section III describes the data,
section IV presents the results, and section V provides concluding comments.
II. Econometric Model and Estimation Method
Estimation of the model is complicated by a nonnegativity constraint on
household debt which is binding for 20 percent of the sample. 11 To control for
both the nonnegativity constraint and the lender imposed borrowing constraint
bivariate probit methods are used. Accordingly, our model is specified by three
principal equations. The first equation Is the household's preferred level of
debt (D*) at current market interest rates. Because we estimate our model using
a cross-section, all households face the same set of market interest rates which
are captured primarily through the constant. 12 Hence, D* is given by,
lOGoldberger (1983) has shown that estimates from selectivity-adjusted equations
are sensitive to the distributional assumption underlying the selection equation.
l1Roughly 29 percent of constrained households and 16 percent of unconstrained
families hold zero debt.
12We argue shortly that although lenders likely do not vary interest rates much
across borrowers, any variation which does occur affects the error term in (1)
and is controlled for through the selection model as described below.D* - xd + el'
6
(1)
where x are household characteristics and d are the corresponding parmeters. The
second equation is an unobservable index that determines whether a household
prefers to hold positive or zero debt at current market interest rates,
1 1 - xa + Ul' (2)
while the third equation is an unobservable index that determines whether the
household is unaffected by borrowing constraints (i.e., the debt ceiling set by
lenders exceeds D*) under current market conditions,
(3)
It follows that if a household is credit constrained or i~ prefers to hold
zero debt then we do not observe D*.13 Note also, that if the demand function
determines whether households hold zero debt, (1) and (2) are identical which is
testable as will become apparent below. 14 In addition, given that a household
130bservations on D* are truncated from below or above depending on whether the
nonnegativity constraint [expression (2)] or the borrowing constraint [expression
(3») are binding. Note also, that the observed level of debt among constrained
families does not necessarily equal the underlying debt ceiling imposed by
lenders. This is because many loan applicants seeking to finance a durable (such
as housing) may choose to hold zero debt, if their loan is rejected. In addition,
households which fail to meet loan repayment schedules may face debt ceilings on
new loan applications which are actually below the amount debt currently held by
those families. The level of debt held by constrained households, therefore,
could be less than, equal to, or exceed the current debt ceiling imposed by
lenders. Because we do not directly observe the debt ceiling for constrained
households, estimates of the parameters of the debt ceiling function are
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. In early versions of this study, we
attempted to estimate the parameters of the debt ceiling function based on a
censored regression model with stochastic and unobserved thresholds [as described
by Maddala (1984), pp. 174-178]. However, these efforts were unsuccessful
because the necessary identification requirements could not be met.
14Henderson and Ioannides (1981) argue that families choose to own a home (and
take on mortgage debt) if their investment demand for. housing exceeds their
consumption demand for housing. Consumption demand for housing is based on the
household's demand for the flow of housing services I but the size of home
acquired (and the corresponding mortgage) is determined by equating risk adjusted
rates of return between housing and nonhousing investments. Accordingly, in
principle the process that determines whet:her families hold mortgage debt and the7
is credit constrained only when it would like to borrow more debt than lenders
will allow. z should include all of the determinants of the demand for debt (x)
as well as any additional regressors that affect lender imposed debt limits but
which do not affect the 'demand for debt itself.
The observable dichotomous representations of (2) and (3) are given by.
ObtO 1. 11 > 0 .. positive debt (4)
0, 11 < 0 • zero debt
and Cr I, Iz > 0 .. not constrained (5)
0, Iz < 0 => constrained
Given that Cr [and expression (3)] is defined only over families that prefer to
hold positive debt (ObtO - I), there are only three distinct cells in the model,
Cr - ObtO - I, Cr - 0 and DbtO - 1. and DbtO - O. Estimation of this model is
further simplified by assuming that tel. ul. uz] is distributed trivariate normal
with mean zero and variance matrix (V).
of Ul.ul Ul,u2
v- ul,ul 1 uUl.u2
CJl.u2 uul.u2 1
Observe, also, that the same model as above can be used to estimate a log-linear
debt demand function simply by reinterpreting D* in (1) as the log of debt. To
simplify exposition, however, we focus on the linear case here (selected results
from the log-normal model are presented later in the paper).
regime that determines the level of mortgage debt could differ. It follows that
a similar argument holds for total household debt.8
Given the distributional assumptions above, the parameters of the model can
be estimated using two step methods [e.g. Tunali (1986)] .15 Initially, a
bivariate probit model is estimated by maximum likelihood to evaluate the
probability that families are unconstrained and would like to hold positive debt
(Cr-DbtO-l). Following Tunali (1986), the log-likelihood function for this model
is given by,
I {(l-DbtO)-log[F(-xa)J + DbtOeCr-log[G(xa I zg.O"ul,u2)]
+ DbtO· (l-Cr)elog[G(xa, -zg. -uul.u2)]},
(6)
where F and G are the unit and bivariate standard normal distribution functions,
respectively.
Based on work by Rosenbaum (1963), Tunali (1986) shows that,
where M 1•u1 and M 1,uz are complicated functions of xa. zg, and O"uI,u2' Explicit
expressions for Hl ul and Ml u2 are provided in Appendix A to facilitate discussion . .
here. Given those expressions, parameter estimates from the bivariate problt
routine (for a, g, and O'ul,uZ) are used to form estimates of M1,ul and M I ,u2 for
each household. These variables are then included in a second stage ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression of the debt function (1) using only unconstrained
households that hold positive debt. Given the distributional assumptions above,
the OLS regression yields consistent estimates of d I 0l,ul' and O"l,u2' while
further manipulation yields a consistent estimate of of. Correct asymptotic
standard errors can then be obtained based on formulae described by Maddala
15We are indebted to seminar participants at the Industrial Labor Relations
workshop at Cornell University for directing us to Tunali's work. Tunali (1986)
c1arifie;; many of the technical issues underlying estimation of bivariate probit
selection models with incomplete classification.9
(1984) and extentions developed by Tunali (1986) .16 Observe also, that if
expressions (1) and (2) are identical, 0'1 - U1.ul, dlul - a, and uU1.u2 - U1.u2lu1.
which in principle is testable given estimates from the bivariate probit and OLS
models.
To clarify how these estimates enable us to evaluate the impact of
borrowing constraints on household debt, we should emphasize that D* [expression
(1)] is the preferred level of debt at prevailing interest rates regardless of
whether the household is unconstrained or constrained. In addition, under the
assumption that unconstrained households with positive debt intend to pay back
their loans, the estimated parameters of (1) are indicative of household behavior
when families abide by their bUdget constraints.17 Hence, xd is the expected
demand for debt for an arbitrary household with characteristics x at prevailing
market interest rates. Idiosyncratic differences in household preferences for
debt. as well as differences in interest rates across borrowers which affect debt
holdings, are reflected in el'
16The bivariate probit model was estimated using Gauss. Estimates of 0'1 and the
correct asymptotic covariance matrix were then obtained using Limdep. Although
the Limdep selection routine is based on a four-cell (complete classification)
bivariate probit model, that routine was modified to the three-cell problem by
setting the index zg equal to an arbitrarily large negative value for
unconstrained families that hold zero debt. For all other families zg was not
modified. Among unconstrained families that hold zero debt. this adjustment
causes M 1•u1 to be replaced with the traditional single selection Mill's ratio
term (based on the nonnegativity constraint) while M 1,u2 equals zero. consistent
with the three-cell asymptotic covariance formula developed by Tunali (1986)
[see, for example, Tunali (1986), page 278].
17As an alternative, in principle one could evaluate the effect of borrowing
constraints on the level of debt held by constrained households simply by asking
those families how much debt they would like to hold. There is no guarantee,
however, that families would respond to such a survey question in an informed
manner which accounts for their budget constraint. The method used here avoids
such problems.10
If el is uncorrelated with both ul and uz, the expected preferred level of
debt for constrained families is simply xd. More generally, however, if there
are unobservable components which affect both the demand for debt and either UI
or u2' the expected value of D* for constrained families may be sensitive to
correlation between the different error terms. 18 To account for possible
selection effects the conditional mean of e1 is formed as,
(8)
where Dc is the observed level of debt held by the constrained household. 19
Observe that (8) is based on the assumption that the preferred level of debt for
constrained households is greater than or equal to Dc. As above, expressions for
1UI.u1 and ml. u2 are provided in Appendix A. From (1) and (8), the expected
preferred level of debt for a constrained household with characteristics x and
z is given by•.
E[D*lx,z; d,B.g; DbtO~lr Cr-O, Dcl - xd (9)
Subtracting Dc from (9) gives the difference between the expected preferred and
actual levels of debt held by constrained families at prevailing market interest
rates,
E[D* - D~I DbtO-l, Cr-O, Dcl
- E(D*lx,z; d,B,g; DbtO-l, Cr-O, Dcl - Dc.
(10)
leFor example, if constrained families face higher interest rates than
unconstrained families, the effect of the higher interest rates on the expected
demand for debt for constrained households would be accounted for by (8).
19Expression (8) is based implicitly on the assumption that expressions (1) and
(2) are identical in which case Ul equals e110l and a - dlol' The implications
of this assumption for expression (8) are reviewed in Appendix A. In addition,
as will become apparent, the qualitative nature of our estimates of the impact
of borrowing constraints do not appear to be sensitive to reasonable alternative
specifications of the nonnegativity constraint.11
III. Data and Variables
The main data source for the study is the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) which contains 4303 households. From these households a subsample was used
which excluded individuals with wealth over 1 million dollars (in 1982 dollars),
any observations with relevant missing values, households which belong to a
special high income group that was over sampled in the survey, and any households
over age 34. The remaining 1224 observations comprise a representative sample
for the United States in 1982 of households under age 35 with under 1 million
dollars in net wealth. For each of these households, the dependent variables in
the model as well as a large number of· variables that belong in the credit
constraint and debt equations are available. Each of these sets of variables are
discussed below (summary statistics and a list of variable definitions are
provided in Appendix B).
Credit Constraint and Debt Variables (Cr, D, DbtO):
As noted earlier, a special feature of the SCF is a series of questions
that enable the researcher to determine a priori whether a family would like to
hold more debt than lenders will allow [see, for example, Jappelli (1990)]. In
particular, households were asked whether they "had a request for credit turned
down by a particular lender or creditor in the past few years, or had been unable
to get as much credit as he/she had applied for," Families that had been turned
down or received less credit than desired were further asked whether they had
successfully reapplied for the desired level of credit at an alternative lender.
In addition, households were asked whether "there had been any time in the past
few years that he/she (or their spouse) had thought about applying for credit at
a particular place, but changed their mind because [the household} thought itmight be turned down. "20
12
Based on these three questions, a household was
defined to be credit constrained in the 1980-1983 period if (i) the household had
not applied for credit because it thought that it would be turned down (the
"dissuaded" households), or (ii) a lender had turned down or not fully granted
a household's loan request and the household did not successfully reapply for the
desired level of credit (the "rejected" households).21
A further strength of the 1983 SCF for our purposes is the extreme detail
given to calculating household debt, assets, and net wealth. For each household,
extensive information was available on different real and financial assets and
debts, which were summed to compute total household assets and debt (in $100.000
20Jappelli (1990) carefully compares the characteristics of (a) households that
received all of the credit they want, (b) families that received less credit than
requested from lenders, and (c) families that considered applying for credit but
were dissuaded from doing so. Jappelli observes that families in groups (b) and
(c) have very similar socioeconomic characteristics, on average, while families
in group (a) are quite different from groups (b) and (c). Based on these
findings Jappelli concludes that families in the "dissuaded" group (c) can be
viewed as credit constrained, along with families that received less credit than
requested. We adopt the same interpretation here. In addition, it is noteworthy
that most households that considered applying for credit but did not because they
thought they would be turned down, cited either a poor credit history, low
income, or lack of job as the principle reason. Also, most of these households
were dissuaded from applying for credit by an established lender.
21We also estimated the entire model excluding the dissuaded households on the
possibility that some of these families may have misunderstood the survey
questions; selected results from that analysis are provided in Appendix D. The
qualitative and (in most cases) the quantitative nature of our results were not
sensitive to whether the dissuaded families were included in the estimation. In
addition, it should be noted that in principle we cannot distinguish between
"genuinely" constrained households versus dishonest loan applicants that have no
intention of repaying the loan. On the other hand, given that it is potentially
costly for households to apply for credit (particularly for mortgage credit), and
given that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of dissuaded
households, our findings are unlikely to be affected by dishonest loan
applicants.13
units) .22 Net wealth was also formed as the difference between non-pension
assets and debt.
Covariates for the Debt and Credit Constraint Functions:
Focusing first on the debt function, presumably net wealth could affect the
demand for debt, although the direction of effect is unclear. On the one hand,
more wealthy families have less need to borrow against future income to smooth
consumption, but more wealthy individuals may also choose to lever up further in
the housing market which could increase their demand for debt. In deciphering
these effects, it is also important to recognize that debt holdings could
influence the observed level of wealth held by a family. 23 Accordingly) to
control for possible simultaneity effects net wealth is regressed on all of the
exogenous variaoles in the model as well as some additional variables taken from
the SCF. The fitted value from the wealth equation (What) was then included in
the demand function.
Appendix C.)
(Results from the wealth regression are provided in
Total household income in $100,000 units (INC82) and INC82 squared
(INCSQ82) were also inclUded in the debt equations under the assumption that the
demand for debt increases with income. Similarly, the unemployment rate in 1982
for the household head's profession (UNEMP) was included to proxy future job and
22The asset data taken from the SCF include the principal financial assets that
households might hold other than pension wealth, plus the current market value
of residential property and autos. Note also, that information on debts is based
on book as opposed to market value. See Avery, Elliehausen, and Kennickell
(1987) for further details on these data.
23Borrowing to finance nondurable consumption immediately lowers net wealth which
implies a simultaneous relationship between wealth and debt. Also, the observed
level of wealth in 1983 is potentially sensitive to whether the family was credit
constrained over the 1980 to 1983 period. Hence, the fitted value of wealth
should also be inclUded in the probit model of who is not credit constrained.income security.
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To the extent that a household's future income is secure,
presumably the family will be more willing to borrow against future income to
smooth current consumption which would increase the demand for debt.
Theory also suggests that households that expect to receive pension
benefits will hold more debt today. To control for such effects, income is
interacted with a dummy variable which equals 1 if either the household head or
spouse expect to receive pension income, and zero otherwise. The resulting
variable (PENINC) proxies expected future pension income and is expected to have
a positive sign.
Demographic variables were also inclUded in the demand function to proxy
preferences for holding debt. These variables include marital status [MARR (1
if married)], sex of the household head [SEX (1 if male)], household size
(HSIZE), education of the household head [Ed (1 if highschool or more)], and race
of the household head {RACE (1 if nonwhite)]. Presumably the demand for debt
increases with household size but the sign on the other sociodemographic
variables is unclear a priori.
Heterogeneity of preferences is further controlled for based on whether
households felt it was "all right for someone like [the respondent] to borrow
money to ..• finance medical expenses or to finance living expenses when income
is cut (EMERG); to finance auto or furniture purchases (DUR); to finance luxury
items (LUX) ,24 or to finance a vacation (CONSUMP)." For each of these variables
an affirmative response was coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. A final dummy variable
(AVERSE) equals 1 if households would not be "... willing to take any financial
risks ... when [saving or making] investments." Presumably, people who feel it
24These inclUded financing for jewelry, fur coats, boats, snowmobiles, and other
hobby equipment.15
is all right to borrow will hold more debt. On the other hand, families that are
relatively risk averse (at least with respect to financial investments) may be
less inclined to lever up in the housing market and would, therefore, hold less
debt.
As noted earlier, all of the variables that affect the demand for debt
should be included in the probit model of whether families perceive themselves
as being credit constrained since the amount of debt demanded affects the
probability of bumping into a debt ceiling. In addition, the observable
socioeconomic variables discussed above could also influence debt limits imposed
by lenders. In particular, one would expect that lenders would be willing to
issue more debt to wealthy households, higher income households, and families
with secure jobs (low UNEMP). On the other hand, the impact of education, sex,
race, marital status, and household size on debt limits less clear, while lenders
typically do not consider pension wealth when making loan decisions and are
unlikely to consider or even be aware of subjective variables like AVERSE.
CONSUMP, LUX, DUR, and EMERG. The expected sign of all of these variables in the
probit model of who is not credit constrained depends on the effect of these
variables on the demand for debt relative to their effect on the debt limits
imposed by lenders. 25
In addition to variables that could also appear in the debt demand
function, when lenders evaluate loan applications they typically base decisions
on information that is indicative of the likelihood of default. Accordingly,
variables were included in the credit constraint equation that indicate the
25For example, the sign on income in the probit model is ambiguous since income
likely has a positive effect on both the demand for debt and the debt ceiling.
On the other hand, one would anticipate a positive coefficient on LUX to the
extent that LUX increases the demand for debt but has. little effect on lender
imposed debt ceilings.16
number of years the household head has worked at the current employer (CUREMP) ,
whether the household has a checking account [CHECK (1 if yes)]. whether the
household has received public assistance [WELFARE (1 if yes)]. and whether the
household has had problems making loan payments in the past three years [BADHST
(1 if yes)],26 In addition, a household was defined as having a history of
homeownership if it purchased or inherited their current home (as of the survey
date) prior to 1980 [OWNHIST (1 if yes)] ,27 Similarly. a household was defined
as having a credit history other than homeownership if it had a nonmortgage loan
still outstanding that was originated prior to 1980 [SOMHST (1 if yes)],28 In
general, variables above that imply a greater risk of default would be expected
to have a negative sign in the probit model of who is not credit constrained,
while variables that imply greater creditworthiness would have a positive
coefficient.
IV. Results
Table I presents results from the bivariate problt model of who would like
to hold positive debt (DbtO=l) and who is not credit constrained (Cr=l) based on
the log-likelihood function in expression (6).29 Note, first, that !1ul.u2 is not
2SWhether the family had received unemployment insurance payments (UI) was also
tested. However this variable was insignificant in all of the models tested and
was dropped from the estimation to simplify the presentation.
270wnership of a mobile home WaS treated as nonhome ownership given the very low
quality of mobile home loans,
28The variables OWNHIST and SOMHST are defined based on pre-19BO activity to
control for possible simultaneity with the probability of being turned down for
credit over 1980·83 period (the period over which the dichotomous Cr variable is
defined) .
29Although Jappelli (1990) estimates a logit model of who is credit constrained
using all of the age groups in the 1983 SCF, there are important differences in
our work. First, Jappelli (1990) includes the observed levels of household net17
significant, which suggests that households with an unexpectedly high propensity
to desire positive debt (relative to xa) are no more likely to be credit
constrained than families with average preferences for holding positive debt.
As will be shown shortly, however, this result does not necessarily imply that
the demand for debt (conditional on wanting to hold positive debt) has no impact
on the propensity to be credit constrained.
Turning to the DbtO equation, observe that wealth (What) does not have a
statistically significant effect on whether households would like to hold
positive debt. One possible explanation for this result is that the desire to
borrow against future income to smooth consumption may decline with wealth, while
the incentive to borrow to lever up in the housing market (the principal consumer
durable) could increase with wealth as new investment opportunities become
availabIe. At least with respect to the zero-one decision to hold positive debt,
potentially these effects could be offsetting.
Although none of the three income variables (INC82, INCSQ82, and PENINC)
are individualy significant, the three are jointly significant and have a
positive effect on the propensity to hold positive debt when evaluated at the
mean level of income. Similarly, male headed households (SEX - 0) and married
households (MARR - 1) are significantly more likely to hold positive debt.
wealth and debt in his logit model without addressing the simultaneity between
net wealth, debt, and the propensity to be constrained. Second, Jappe1i includes
the log of debt in his logit model without explicitly controlling for families
that hold zero debt. Given the large number of families in the SCF (both
constrained and unconstrained) that hol-d zero debt the resulting specification
error could be severe. In contrast, our procedure explicitly controls for any
selection effects related to the decision to hold positive debt. In addition,
our estimation includes several variables related to household creditworthiness
and preferences that are not used by Jappelli (1990); these variables include
UNEMP, PENINC, AVERSE, CONSUMP, LUX, DUR, EMERG, CUREMP, BADHST, OWNHIST, SOMHST,
CHECK, and WELFARE. Many of these variables are significant in the credit
constraint and debt equations and provide further insight into the determinants
of who is credit constrained.18
Observe also, that families that feel it is all right to borrow to finance a
durable (DUR) or a luxury (LUX) item are more likely to hold positive debt. As
will be seen shortly, all of these variables have similar qualitative effects on
the level of debt families would like to hold.
Focusing on the credit constraint function, several variables that appear
on loan applications and which are more closely associated with creditworthiness
than the demand for debt are significant predictors of who is credit constrained.
Households are more likely to face binding borrowing constraints if they have a
bad credit history (BADHST-l) or no credit history (OWNHIST-O). if they do not
have a checking account (CHECK-O), or if the family has recently been on welfare
(WELFARE-l).30 The variables SOMHST and CUREMP also have the anticipated signs
but are not significant.
Given that the remaining variables in the credit constraint probit model
appear in the demand function as well. it is useful to review those variables in
conjunction with the selectivity-adjusted demand function, the OLS demand
function, and the Tobit demand function in Table II. As will be discussed
shortly, the selectiVity variables are not significant, which suggests that the
OLS model or possibly the Tobit routine provides a more accurate representation
of the relative importance of the different covariates in the model.
In Table I it is striking that household wealth. income, and income
security (as proxied by UNEMP) do not have a statistically significant effect on
30These results are consistent with empirical findings by Boyes, Hoffman and Low
(1989) and Orgler (1970) which indicate that the acceptance/rejection of credit
card applications and consumer loan defaults are significantly correlated with
creditworthiness variables similar to those above.19
the propensity of families to be credit constrained.31 But this result is at
least partially explained by the positive and generally significant impact of
wealth and income on the demand for debt in Table II, and the negative and
significant effect of UNEMP. 32 Accordingly, it appears that the amount of debt
lenders are willing to extend increases with borrower income and wealth. as well
as with increased job and income security.
RACE (1 if nonwhite) has a negative and significant effect on the
propensity to obtain the desired level of credit, and a negative (but marginally
significant) effect on the demand for debt. This result suggests that credit
limits are tighter for nonwhite families, at least after controlling for the
other regressors in the model, consistent with findings by Gabriel and Rosenthal
(forthcoming).33 The opposite result holds for marital status (1 if married)
which has a positive and significant effect on the propensity to obtain the
desired level of credit, and a generally positive (and insignificant) effect on
31This result is in contrast to that of Jappelli (1990) who found significant
evidence that higher income and more wealthy households were less likely to be
credit constrained. However, the differences between our results and those of
Jappelli (1990) may reflect differences in specification as noted earlier.
321f households borrow only to purchase nondurables, with relatively minor
additional restrictions the demand for debt would decline with income and wealth.
In contrast, if households borrow to purchases durables (such as housing), the
demand for debt could increase with income and wealth as above. Although it
would be interesting to distinguish between borrowing for nondurables versus
borrowing to finance the purchase of durables, to simplify the analysis
throughout this paper it is implicitly assumed that different forms of debt are
close substitutes. Then, under the null that borrowing constraints do not
matter, one can test whether the total "level of household debt is sensitive to
binding borrowing constraints; evidence for such an effect is sufficient to
indicate that household behavior is sensitive to binding borrowing constraints.
33These results, of course, do not necessarily imply the presence of "bigotry"
on the part of lenders, but could indicate that race is correlated with other
(unobservable) variables that proxy default risk. For example, discrimination
in labor markets (where nonwhites historically have been last hired and first
fired) affects job and income security which in turn influences lender decisions.20
the demand for debt. Hence, it appears that borrowing limits are less stringent
for married families, ceteris paribus. a4
Household size (HSIZE) and a willingness to borrow for luxury (LUX) items
have negative and marginally significant effects on the propensity to obtain the
desired level of credit. In contrast, these variables have positive effects on
the demand for credit. Given the combination of estimated effects on HSIZE, it
is not possible to determine the direction of effect (if any) of HSIZE on lender
imposed borrowing constraints. On the other hand, recall that LUX pertains to
whether households felt it was "all right" for someone like themselves to borrow
to finance the purchase of luxury items. Given the subjective nature of LUX,
presumably such preference related information does not influence lender
decisions. Accordingly, the negative coefficient on LUX in the credit constraint
model further suggests that families with a higher intrinsic demand for debt are
more likely to be credIt constrained. In addition, when viewed as a whole, our
model results [and findings from Jappelli (1990)] suggest that lenders vary
credit limits across borrowers on the basis of observable characteristics that
proxy credit risk, consistent with "screening" models of credit rationing (e.g.•
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). part IV).35
34This interpretation is consistent with Boyes, Hoffman, and Low (1989) who find
that marriage has a negative and significant effect on the probability that a
borrower defaults on a consumer loan.
35Given the degree to which debt limits vary with observable household
characteristics, these findings suggest that most households probably have (or
can easily acquire) considerable information to determine whether they would
qualify for a desired loan. To the extent that households are well informed
about their access to credit, this lends support to our contention [and that of
Jappelli (1990)] that carefully constructed data sets such as the 1983 SCF enable
the researcher to determine a priori which households face binding borrowing
constraints.21
Turning to the selectivity variables in the demand function, it is apparent
that neither 0l.ul or 01.u2 are significant. One possible explanation for this
result is that M 1•u1 could be collinear with M 1 •u2 • In that case. however, one
might expect that controlling for selectivity related to Cr while ignoring the
nonnegativity constraint. or vice versa, would yield significant estimates of
selectivity effects. Results based on the single selection models are presented
in columns (1) and (2) of Table Ill. In both cases the selection terms still are
not significant and the estimated parameters of the debt function (d) are not
statistically different from the selection model in Table II (based on a series
of Wa1d tests). 36
Alternatively, functional form could account for the apparent lack of
selectivity-related effects. In column (3) of Table III, when a log-linear debt
demand function was estimated controlling only for credit-related selectivity,
01,u2 was negative and significant. (In contrast, similar tests of the
nonnegativity constraint still indicated that 0l.ul was not significant).37 This
result suggests that households with an unexpectedly high demand for debt may in
fact be more likely to encounter binding borrowing cons.traints, but that our
ability to discern such effects is sensitive to the functional form imposed.
36We should note, of course, that our ability to identify 0l,ul relies primarily
on the nonlinearity of the selectivity variable given that (1) and (2) are based
on the same covariates. This is especially apparent in column (2) of Table III
where only the nonnegativity constraint is modelled. In contrast. recall that
the probit model of who is not constrained contains a number of variables not
included in the demand function.
J7The log-linear model was also estimated based on the dual selection
specification and controlling only for the nonnegativity constraint; in both
cases 0l,ul was small and not significant. In addition, the estimated parameters
from those demand functions were nearly identical to estimates presented in
column (3) of Table III and are not presented for that reason.22
Note that if the log-normal model Is the ·correct" specification, then the
regime that determines whether households hold positive or zero debt [expression
(2») must differ from the debt demand function [expression (1»). In contrast,
for the linear model recall that if equations (1) and (2) are identical, U1 -
(11,u1' a - d/(11, and 17ul,u2 - 0"1,112/01. Test results of these restrictions were
mixed. Our estimate of 01 is close to that of 171.u1 (in any of the relevant
models), both (1u1,u2 and CTl,u2 are not significant (in the linear case), but a ¥laId
test rejects the null that a - d/CT1,U1,38
Given mixed evidence about the "correct" specification of the nonnegativity
constraint. it is desireable to evaluate how sensitive our results are to changes
in the model specification. In that regard I for the class of linear debt
functions, since neither selectivity term (M1,ul or M 1•uZ ) in Table II is
significant, the debt demand function could be estimated by OLS using only
unconstrained households that hold positive debt (column (2) of Table II). If
instead, we simply impose the restriction that expressions (1) and (2) are alike,
the debt model can be estimated by maximum likelihood Tobit (column (3) of Table
II). As above, parameter estimates from these models were not statistically
different from estimates based on the selectivity model in Table II or the linear
models in Table 111.39 These results suggest that, at least for the linear
case, estimates of the debt function parameters are not sensitive to reasonable
alternative specifications of the nonnegativity constraint.
38A Wald statistic was formed based on d/CT1,ul [from column (3)] and a from the
bivariate probit model where the variance matrix for d/"l ul was calculated based
on the Delta method [see Billingsley (1979) for a discussion of the Delta
method]. The test statistic equalled 97.2 and is distributed X2(l6).
39A Wald test statistic based on the selectivity-adjusted and Tobit demand
functions in Table II, for example, equals 4.4 and is distributed XZ(16) which
fails to reject the null that the coefficients from the two models are alike.23
The Impact of Borrowing Constraints on Constrained Households:
Two methods were used to evaluate the impact of borrowing constraints on
constrained households. Initially, a Tobit model of household debt was estimated
for constrained families as well as for the full sample (columns (1) and (2) of
Table IV. respectively). Note that under the null that borrowing constraints do
not matter, one natural specification for the debt function would be a Tobit
model. A likelihood ratio test based on the Tobit models in Table II and Table
IV, however, strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a unified sample (the test
statistic equals 80). Accordingly, it appears that binding borrowing constraints
have a significant effect on the behavior of households, at least with respect
to their demand for debt.
As discussed earlier, an alternative method of evaluating the impact of
borrowing constraints is to use expression (10) to predict the difference between
actual and preferred levels of debt held by constrained families. Histograms of
the predicted impacts (and the corresponding mean impact) are presented in
Figures I through III for the models in columns (1) through (3) of Table II, and
in Figure IV for column (3) of Table III.
The estimated impacts based on the dual selectivity-adjusted linear demand
function (Figure I) are small relative to the other models, but this result
should probably be discounted given the insignificant selectivity terms upon
which the histogram is based. In addition, the log-liner model (Figure IV) was
sensitive to outliers when predicting D* for constrained families, causing us to
view results from Figure IV with some caution. 40 Instead, given that the OLS
model and the Tobit models did not appear to be sensitive to outliers, and given
40The estimated impact of borrOWing constraints based on the log-linear model
exceeds $300.000 for roughly 10 percent of constrained households. In addition,
a number of families had predicted impacts over $500,000.24
the lack of selectivity effects in the linear case, we are inclined to focus on
Figures II and III as our preferred estimates of the impact of borrowing
constraints. In those figures, note that of the constrained households in the
sample, roughly half would hold at least $12,000 (1982 dollars) more debt if
borrowing constraints had been relaxed, ceteris paribus.41
V. Conclusions
If the Life Cycle and Permanent Income Hypotheses (LCH) do not hold in
their strongest form, current income could affect current consumption which
suggests a potential role for macro-stabilization policy.42 In addition, the
demand for consumer durables (such as housing) could be sensitive to current as
well as to permanent Income. Using a unique set of variables in the 1983 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) , this study finds that 30 percent of households under
age 35 (in the early 1980s) would like to hold more debt than lenders will allow,
and that roughly half of these families would hold substantially more debt if
borrowing constraints were relaxed, ceteris paribus. In addition, binding
borrowing constraints appear to have a significant effect on the behavior of
households, at least with respect to the amount of debt families hold.
It should be emphasized that these results do not imply that the
underpinnings of the LCH are without merit. Indeed, 70 percent of our sample
report that they hold as much debt as they would like, suggesting that the
41These results are consistent with findings by Rosenthal and Duca (1990)
(obtained using the same data as here) which suggest that binding borrowing
constraints significantly reduce the likelihood that a constrained household
would reside in owner-occupied housing.
42In their strongest form, the Life-Cycle and Permanent Income Hypotheses (LCH)
suggest that households maximize intertemporal utility subject to a single
lifetime budget constraint. A well known implication of this model is that
households base consumption decisions on permanent as opposed to current income.25
behavior of these families may be relatively more consistent with the LCH. On
the other hand, the presence of binding borrowing constraints for an important
subset of the population provides one explanation for why empirical studies
frequently find evidence that consumer spending and behavior do not display
characteristics that are consistent with a strict interpretation of the LCH.
Our study also provides new insights into the determinants of who is credit
constrained. In particular, households with intrinsically strong preferences for
holding debt are more likely to be constrained, while families that are more
likely to default or have trouble making loan payments face tighter debt limits.
In addition, it appears that lenders vary credit limits across borrowers on the
basis of a wide range of observable characteristics that proxy credit risk,
consistent with ·screening" models of credit rationing.26
TABLE I
Bivariate Probit Model of Who is Not Credit Constrained
and Who Would Like to Hold Positive Debt
Holding Positive Debt
(DbtO - 1)
Not Being Credit Constrained
(Cr - 1)
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio

















































































































CONST -.274362 -1.866 - .133302 -2.175 -.255654 -4.351
WHAT .117897 2.039 .953357E-01 2.197 .135538 3.102
INC82 1.02988 4.864 .910720 5.109 .904771 5.162
INCSQ82 -.296274 -1.656 - .189272 -1. 342 -.248435 -1.778
PENINC .132980 1.690 .977025E-01 1.431 .155941 2.274
UNEMP -.594836E-02 -3.488 -.569174E-03 -3.380 -.524815E-03 -3.270
ED .297026E-01 .896 .217758E-01 .699 .252023E-01 .840
SEX .334884E-Ol 1.244 .498674E-01 2.458 .273429E-01 1.369
RACE -.522844E-01 -1.450 -.408808E-01 -1.309 - .590191E-01 -1.990
MARR .192826E-Ol .467 -.126395E-01 - .458 .363123E-01 1.356
HSIZE .268745E-01 2.685 .254904E-Ol 2.872 .240607E-01 2.738
AVERSE -.156284E-01 -0.757 -.193413E-01 -.952 -.128697E-01 -.645
CONSUMP -.420212E-01 -1. 541 -.443660E-01 -1.669 -.395452E-01 -1.517
LUX .464768E-01 1.976 .391252E-01 1.822 .431772E-01 2.020
DUR .587353E-01 0.899 .109511E-01 .275 .673588E-01 1.862
EMERG -.169958E-03 -0.006 .110281E-01 .388 -.598401E-02 -.211
M1,ul .231881 0.980
M1 u2 .623833E-02 0.077 ,
Ul .268847 .245168 .254765
R2 .386612 .385625
F 25.6565 29.0402
SSR 41.6476 41. 714651
Log-L - - -131.90
Mean of D .228309 .228309 .191155
Std. Dev. of D .309460 .309460 .295420
Obs 710 710 848
·T-ratios are adjusted for selection effects.28
TABLE III
Debt Demand Functions With Different Selection Terms·
Linear Demand Functions Log-Linear Demand Function
Cr Selection Only DbtO Selection Only with Cr Selection Only
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio
._----~--------------------------_.------------------- .-----------------------.----._.-------------
CONST -.148173 -1.957 - .259811 -1.693 -4.53167 -8.602
WHAT .107463 1.896 .109983 2.239 .529036 1.287
INC82 .928421 5.030 1.00840 4.637 4.37875 3.281
INCSQ82 -.213749 -1.350 -.272661 -1. 554 -2.62236 -2.255
PENINC .107798 1.451 .126793 1.592 .213046 .389
UNEKP -.569004E-02 -3.413 -.593543E-02 -3.346 -.205065E-01 -1.738
ED .200220E-01 .640 .299459E-01 .888 .626434 2.873
SEX .506923E-01 2.504 .340333E-01 I 1.226 .108654 .753
RACE -.464992E-01 -1.317 - .477976E-01 -1.435 .208511 .887
MARR -.768645E-02 -.246 .140007E-01 .340 .686764E-01 .313
HSIZE .242861E-01 2.550 .275198E-01 2.844 .195488 2.888
AVERSE -.191822E-01 -.953 -.159661E-01 -.733 .303752E-01 .213
CONSUMP - .458077E-01 -1.717 ..412947E-01 -1.457 -.816847E-01 ..439
LUX .379140E-01 1.757 .467654E-01 1.916 .250718 1.635
DUR .840479E-02 .209 .581330E-01 .880 .545033 1.905
EMERG .100745E-01 .356 .100973E-02 .031 .127080E-02 .006
A(xa) - - .233961 .917
A(Zg) .258802E-01 .329 - - -1.92042 -3.649
°1 .24300 .26731 1.9266
R2 .38572 .38635 .409131
F 27.197 27.270 29.9905
SSR 41.708 41.665 1437.64
Obs 710 710 710
-All demand functions were estimated by OLS using only unconstrained households with positive debt. T-ratios
are corrected for selection effects. A(S) is the Mill's ratio evaluated at s.29
TABLE IV
Tobit Debt Demand Models for Constrained







CONST -.762262E-01 -1.202 -.212091 -4.637
WHAT .226857 3.906 .167208 4.732
INC82 .106502 .420 .742339 5.279
INCSQ82 .437017 1.196 -.165884 -1.423
PENINC .200106 1.989 .180170 3.158
UNEMP -.222517E-03 -1.345 -.460102E-03 -3.693
ED .340417E-Ol 1.199 .318645E-Ol 1.405
SEX .261860E-Ol 1.266 .245941E-Ol 1.587
RACE -.247446E-Ol -1.076 -.504362E-Ol -2.429
MARR .638379E-Ol 2.437 .503060E-Ol 2.478
HSIZE -.555534E-02 - .689 .118878E-Ol 1.824
AVERSE .201294E-Ol 1.013 -.183389E-02 - .120
CONSUMP -.103641E-Ol - .436 -.322621E-Ol -1.659
LUX .129617E-Ol .613 .339844E-Ol 2.070
DUR .298052E-Ol .727 .604459E-Ol 2.106
EMERG -.372371E-Ol -1.237 -.151401E-01 -.681
"
.165264 23.305 .234773 44.041
Log-L 46.290 -125.16
Mean of D .088576 .159644
Std. Dev. of D .170461 .267568
Obs. 376 122430
FIGURE I
Distribution of Impacts on 376 Constrained Households
In 100,000 Dollar Units (1982 dollars)
(Dual Selectivity-Adjusted Model - Column (1) of Table II)
Mean Impact - .047. Median Impact - .045
Lower limit Upper limit Frequency Cumulative Frequency
-.2571 -.1378 9 ( .0239) 9 ( .0239)
-.1378 -.0914 24 ( .0638) 33 ( .0878)
-.0914 -.0450 49 ( .1303) 82 ( .2181)
- .0450 .0013 56 ( .1489) 138 ( .3670)
.0013 .0477 67 ( .1782) 205 ( .5452)
.0477 .0941 57 ( .1516) 262 ( .6968)
.0941 .1404 45 ( .1197) 307 ( .8165)
.1404 .1868 28 ( .0745) 335 ( .8910)
.1868 .2332 19 ( .0505) 354 ( .9415)
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Distribution of Impacts on 376 Constrained Households
In 100,000 Dollar Units (1982 dollars)
(OLS Model - Column (2) of Table II)
Mean Impact - .095, Median Impact - .120
Lower limit Upper limit Frequency Cumulative Frequency
-.5921 -.1667 25 ( .0665) 25 ( .0665)
-.1667 - .1013 7 ( .0186) 32 ( .0851)
- .1013 -.0359 20 ( .0532) 52 ( .1383)
-.0359 .0294 45 ( .1197) 97 ( .2580)
.0294 .0948 64 ( .1702) 161 ( .4282)
.0948 .1602 86 ( .2287) 247 ( .6569)
.1602 .2256 67 ( .1782) 314 ( .8351)
.2256 .2909 42 ( .1117) 356 ( .9468)
.2909 .3563 12 ( .0319) 368 ( .9787)
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FICURE III
Distribution of Impacts on 376 Constrained Households
In 100,000 Dollar Units (1982 dollars)
(Tobit Model - Column (3) of Table II)
Mean Impact - .216, Median Impact- .200
Lower limit Upper limit Frequency Cumulative Frequency
-.2102 .1159 14 ( .0372) 14 ( .0372)
.1159 .1410 10 ( .0266) 24 ( .0638)
.1410 .1662 34 ( .0904) 58 ( .1543)
.1662 .1913 83 ( .2207) 141 ( .3750)
.1913 .2165 77 ( .2048) 218 ( .5798)
.2165 .2416 63 ( .1676) 281 ( .7473)
.2416 .2667 39 ( .1037) 320 ( .8511)
.2667 .2919 19 ( .0505) 339 ( .9016)
.2919 .3170 17 ( .0452) 356 ( .9468)
.3170 .6324 20 ( .0532) 376 (1.0000)
Frequency --------.-----------------------------------------------------
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FIGURE IV
Distribution of Impacts on 376 Constrained Households
In 100,000 Dollar Units (1982 dollars)
(Log-linear Model - Column (4) of Table II)
Mean Impact - ****. Median Impact - .550
Lower limit Upper limit Frequency Cumulative Frequency
-.2338 .0000 2 ( .0053) 2 ( .0053)
.0000 .2500 93 ( .2473) 95 ( .2527)
.2500 .5000 85 ( .2261) 180 ( .4787)
.5000 .7500 52 ( .1383) 232 ( .6170)
.7500 1.0000 29 ( .0771) 261 ( .6941)
1.0000 2.0000 49 ( .1303) 310 ( .8245)
2.0000 3.0000 25 ( .0665) 335 ( .89.10)
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APPENDIX A
SELECTIVITY VARIABLES
As noted in the text, given the assumption that felt U1. u2] are
distributed trivariate normal with zero means and variance matrix V I the
conditional expectation of 81 given that a household is not eredit constrained
(Cr-l) and holds positive debt (Dbto-l) can be written as,
(A.I)
while the conditional expectation of D* Is,
(A.2)
Based on work by Rosenbaum (1961), Fishs et al (1981), and Maddala (1984), for
k1 - • xa and kz - - zg. MI, ..1 and M 1....2 can be written as.
KI ,..1 - (l-(1~1.U2)-1. (Pul 0\1.1 tlZF<l2].
HI,uz {l-U~l 112)-1. (Pu2 Uul,u2Plld I
where,
Pul - {I ;,J ., ul g(u1l u2) dUlduZ}IG( -kIt -k2) ,





and g and G are the standard bivariate normal density and distribution functions,
respectively. Expressions (A.5) and (A.6) can be simplified as,
p...
where,
{E(k,)[I-F(k,)) + a.,.•,E(k,)[I-F(k;J l}/G(-k,.-k,).





and f and F are the unit normal density and distribution functions, respectively.
Observe that H1•u1 and M 1,u2 depend on the parameters a, g, and uul,u2 which can be
estimated based on bivariate probit methods as described in the text.
lJhen households are credit constrained ml,u1 and ml.u2 can be obtained based
on a methodology similar to that above. If we impose the restriction that
expressions (1) and (2) in the text are alike, Ul > Dc/Ul - xa, where Dc is the
level of debt actually held by the household (as described in the text). and Uz
< - zg. 43 To form m 1•u1 and ml,u2' k1 is redefined as Dc/e1 - xa, while kz is
defined as zg; these expressions are then substituted into the formulae above.
In addition, because the direction of integration for Uz has been reversed (uz
is less than -zg instead of greater than -zg) , (A.7) and (A.8) are written as,
(A.H)
(A.12)
where a negative sign now appears before f(k2).
When calculating impacts based on the Tobit model in Table II, expression
(A.2) simplifies considerably since ul,uZ is set equal to zero and we impose the
assumption that (1) and (2) are identical. In that case, (A.2) becomes,
(A.13)
where k1 - Dc/el - xd/ul' Expression (A.13) was also used to calculate impacts
associated with the OLS model in Table II.
~3If expressions (1) and (2) differ. in principle it would be desireable to
control for three forms of truncation when forming tIll,ul and ml,uZ; e1 > Dc - xd,
u1 > - xa, and Uz < - zg. As an alternative, the procedure described above
implicitly sets -xd equal to negative infinity (when forming ml ul and m 1 uZ) which
eliminates one form of truncation, while imposing the assumption that ~l > D c/Ql
- xa. instead of Ul > - xa. To the extent that expressions (1) and (2) in the
text are similar, errors associated with this approach are unlikely to affect the
qualitative nature of our findings.36
APPENDIX B
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Cr equals a dummy variable equal to 1 if not credit constrained and 0 otherwise.
D equals total household debts (book value) in 1982 dollars (in 100,000 dollar
units) .
Wealth equals household net worth (A - D) in 1982 in current dollars (in 100,000
dollar units).
What equals the fitted value from the Wealth regression (in Appendix C).
Assets equals total non-pension household real and financial assets in 1982
dollars (in 100,000 dollar units).
INC82 equals total household income in 1982 dollars (in 100,000 dollar units).
INCSQ82 equals total household income in 1982 squared (INC82 squared).
UNEMP equals the 1982 unemployment rate of the household head's profession.
ED equals 1 if the household head has a highschool degree or more.
SEX equals 1 if the household head is male.
RACE equals 1 if the household head is nonwhite.
MARR equals 1 if married.
HSIZE equals the number of people in the household.
PENINC equals INC82 multiplied by a dummy variable (PEN), where PEN equal 1 if
either the household head or spouse expect to receive pension income upon
retirement.
AVERSE equals 1 if the household was not Willing to take on any risk in investing
family savings.
CONSUMP equals 1 if the household head felt it was "all right for someone like
[the respondent] to borrow money to finance a vacation."
LUX equals 1 if the household head felt it was "all right for someone like [the
respondent] to borrow money to finance the purchase of a fur coat, boat, or other
luxury items."
DUR equals 1 if the household head felt it was "all right for someone like [the
respondent] to borrow money to finance the purchase of furniture or a car."37
EHERG equals 1 if the household head felt it: was "all right for someone like [the
respondent) to borrow money to finance medical expenses or to finance living
expenses when income is cut."
CUREKP equals the number of years working at current employer.
BADHST equals 1 if the household had problems making loan payments in the last
three years.
OVNHIST equals 1 if the household bought a home prior to 1980.
SOMHST equals 1 if the household has a nonmortgage loan outstanding that was
originated prior to 1980.
WELFARE equals 1 if the household received public assistance in 1982.
CHECK equals 1 if the household has a checking account.
FULLTIHE equals 1 if the household head is currently working fu11time.
EXPINHER equals 1 if the household anticipates receiving a "large" inheritance.
INHERIT equals 1 if the household has received a "large" inheritance.
FULLINC equals ·FULLTIME multiplied by INC82.
EXPINC equals EXPINHER multiplied by INC82.38
VARIABLE SUHHARY STATISTICS
Constrained Unconstrained Unconstained DbtO-l Full Sample
376 obs. 848 obs. 710 obs. 1224 obs.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
a __________._. ______________ • _______________________________________________________________________
CR .00000 .00000 1.0000 .00000 1.0000 .00000 .69281 .46152
DbtO 1.0000 .00000 .83726 .36934 1.0000 .00000 .88725 .31641
Debt .88576E-01 .17046 .19116 .29542 .22831 .30946 .15964 .26757
Wealth .13475 .32998 .35558 .66143 .39295 .67114 .28774 .58887
What .15848 .24355 .34506 .36865 .38115 .37932 .28774 .34601
ASSETS .22332 .42945 .54674 .82158 .62126 .84176 .44739 .73912
INC82 .16254 .11570 .23993 .17590 .25862 .17815 .21616 .16373
INCSQ82 .39768E-01 .65274E-01 .88471E-01 .17087 .98577E-01 .18033 .73510E-01 .14843
PENINC .73584E-01 .12816 .13852 .17986 .15597 .18594 .11857 .16834
UNEMP 5.2151 5.8984 5.4973 6.1506 5.4415 5.8976 54.107 60.732
ED .84043 .36670 .87382 .33225 .88732 .31642 .86356 .34339
SEX .48138 .50032 .56132 .49652 .54930 .49791 .53676 .49885
RACE .27394 .44657 .14033 .34753 .11408 .31814 .18137 .38548
MARR .47606 .50009 .65212 .47658 .70986 .45415 .59804 .49049
HSIZE 2.7500 1.5769 2.7748 1.4333 2.8676 1.4110 2.7672 1.4783
AVERSE .44681 .49783 .37028 .48317 .36197 .48091 .39379 .48879
CONSUMP .19947 .40013 .15330 .36049 .15493 .36209 .16748 .37356
LUX .30053 .45910 .28656 .45242 .30423 .46040 .29085 .45434
OUR .93883 .23996 .91745 .27536 .93944 .23870 .92402 .26508
EMERG .90160 .29826 .88208 .32271 .87465 .33135 .88807 .31541
CUREMP 2.4122 3.0538 3.3774 3.6232 3.5563 3.7101 3.0809 3.4856
BADHST .31117 .46359 .15566 .36275 .18310 .38702 .20343 .40272
OWNHIST .10904 .31211 .26061 .43923 .30000 .45858 .21405 .41033
SOMHST .84574 .36167 .87382 .33225 .84930 .35801 .86520 .34165
WELFARE .24468 .43047 .82547E-01 .27536 .64789E-01 .24633 .13235 .33901
CHECK .61436 .48739 .77241 .41953 .82535 .37993 .72386 .44727
FULLTIME .59043 .49241 .67925 .46704 .69859 .45919 .65196 .47654
EXPINHER .19947 .40013 .24057 .42768 .24507 .43043 .22794 .41968
INHERIT .10638 .30874 .77830E-01 .26806 .76056£-01 .26528 .86601E-01 .28136
FULLINC .11455 .13402 .17716 .18552 .19131 .18998 .15793 .17372
EXPINC .37928E-01 .92106E-01 .64397E-01 .14830 .70184E-01 .15773 .56266E-01 .1341039
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PENINC - .556817 -4.904
UNEMP -.441634E-03 -1.650
ED .358908E-Ol .819





CONSUMP - .326270E-01 -.847











INHERIT -.674185E-01 -1. 340
FULLINC -.347664 -1. 811
EXPINC .771757 4.006






Bivariate Probit Model of Who is Not Credit Constrained
















































































































Selectivity-Adjusted Linear Demand Function
Excluding Dissuaded Families

























































Distribution of Impacts on 253 Constrained Households
In $100,000 (1982 $) Units Based on the OLS Model (Column (2) of Table II)
Mean Impact - .090, Median Impact - .120
Lower limit Upper limit Frequency Cumulative Frequency
-.5504 -.1740 19 ( .0751) 19 ( .0751)
- .1740 -.1079 4 ( .0158) 23 ( .0909)
-.1079 - .0418 15 ( .0593) 38 ( .1502)
- .0418 .0243 25 ( .0988) 63 ( .2490)
.0243 .0904 44 ( .1739) 107 ( .4229)
.0904 .1565 58 ( .2292) 165 ( .6522)
.1565 .2226 45 ( .1779) 210 ( .8300)
.2226 .2887 28 ( .1107) 238 ( .9407)
.2887 .3548 8 ( .0316) 246 ( .9723)
.3548 .6404 7 ( .0277) 253 (1.0000)42
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